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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
MLDC, the employer of probationer Matt Eugene Ruck, appeals from the 
district court's order denying MLDC's request that a laptop computer seized from 
Ruck during a probation search be turned over to MLDC. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Matt Eugene Ruck pied guilty to one count of forgery and admitted a 
probation violation in a different case. (R., vol. I, pp. 81-82.) The district court 
imposed a sentence of seven years with two years determinate on the forgery 
and a concurrent sentence of three years with one fixed related to the probation 
violation. (R., vol. I, pp. 82, 85.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (R., vol. I, 
pp. 83, 86.) 
At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court 
suspended the sentences and placed Ruck on probation. (R., vol. I, pp. 110, 
114-119.) Conditions of that probation included that Ruck "not be self-employed" 
and that he not be "named on any bank account and not apply for any extended 
credit or be a party of any credit arrangements." (R., vol. I, pp. 110, 119.) Ruck 
also agreed to submit to searches by probation and parole officers. (R., vol. I, 
pp.117-18.) 
A subsequent probation search of Ruck's backpack showed evidence that 
Ruck had violated his probation by travelling to New Orleans and American 
Samoa in violation of a probation condition that he not leave the state without 
permission. (R., vol. II, pp. 156-57, 246.) Also in the backpack were two 
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computers-a laptop and an i-Pad-which probation officers seized. (R., vol. II, 
pp. 157-58, 246.) Probation officers also seized credit cards and other evidence 
Ruck was not in compliance with various terms of his probation. (R., vol. II, pp. 
158, 168-70.) 
Ruck's employer, MLDC, claimed ownership of the laptop computer and 
filed a civil action for its return. (R., vol. II, pp. 128-54, 171-84, 246.) The district 
court in the criminal case treated MLDC's filing as a motion for return of property 
and denied it. (R., vol. II, pp. 245-52.) MLDC appealed. (R., vol. II, pp. 254-58.) 
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ISSUES 
MLDC states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Does a defendant's probationary status in a closed criminal 
case qualify as a "pending action" for purposes of 
establishing forum in an Idaho Criminal Rule 41 (e) motion? 
B. Whether the Respondent's failure to adhere to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 49(a) resulted in an interference of [sic] 
MLDC's right to procedural due process. 
C. Was MLDC's right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure under the 4th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State 
Constitution violated by the seizure and pending search of 
the corporate laptop? 
D. Did the District Court err in denying MLDC's motion for the 
return of unlawfully seized property under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 41 (e)? 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction over motions for return of property 
taken as a result of a probation search? 





MLDC Has Failed To Show That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Deny 
His Request For Return Of The Laptop 
A. Introduction 
MLDC initially filed a petition with a civil case number seeking custody of 
the laptop. (R., vol. II, pp. 136-42.) That matter was stayed and the question of 
custody of the laptop was addressed in the criminal case in which Ruck was on 
probation. (R., vol. II, pp. 245-52.) On appeal MLDC contends that the district 
court erred when it concluded that the criminal case was the appropriate forum 
for resolution of its request for the laptop. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-21.1) 
MLDC's argument is without merit because the district court had jurisdiction to 
resolve claims arising from the supervision of Ruck's probation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de nova. State v. Barros, 131 
Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998); State v. Law, 131 Idaho 90, 93, 
952 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1997). The interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule 
presents a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. 
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91-92, 90 P.3d 314, 316-17 (2004) (citing State v. 
1 MLDC also argues that the state's failure to serve Ruck with MLDC's motion 
somehow "negatively impacted" some unspecified rights held by MLDC and 
therefore should result in reversal of the district court's order. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 21-24.) MLDC has not supported this claim with any relevant legal authority 
suggesting that MLDC may assert Ruck's alleged due process rights. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported 
by authority "will not be considered" on appeal). 
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Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997); State v. Dallas, 126 Idaho 
273, 274, 882 P.2d 440, 441 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Rule On MLDC's Request For 
Return Of The Laptop 
Procedural rules are interpreted according to principles of statutory 
construction. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900, 188 
P.3d 834, 843 (2008). The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); 
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). 
Because "the best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. 
Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory 
language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law 
as written. Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 
P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only 
one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that 
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that 
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was 
"palpably absurd"). 
Applying these standards to l.C.R. 41 (e) shows that the district court had 
jurisdiction in the criminal case to hear MLDC's request to obtain custody of the 
laptop seized from Ruck during a probation search. Rule 41 (e) provides that a 
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"person aggrieved by a search and seizure may move the district court for the 
return of the property." l.C.R. 41 (e). The motion "shall" be presented "only" in 
the criminal case if one is "pending," but if no criminal case is pending a civil 
action "may be filed in the county where the property is seized or located." l.C.R. 
41(e). The plain language of this rule is that the motion shall be presented only 
in the pending criminal case, but may be presented as a civil case only if "no 
[criminal] action is pending." l.C.R. 41 (e). Because the criminal case against 
Ruck was pending insofar as his probation was still being managed by the district 
court, the district court correctly concluded that the motion was required to be 
filed in the criminal case. 
Generally a "district court's jurisdiction is completed upon the 'entry of the 
judgment and sentence or its affirmance on appeal."' State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 
207, 211, 912 P.2d 94, 98 (1996) (quoting State v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 157, 161, 
269 P.2d 769, 771 (1954)). Thus, a court, having exercised its original 
jurisdiction to completion of the case, loses jurisdiction to consider collateral or 
other attacks upon that judgment. kl "Absent a statute or rule extending its 
jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or 
affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 
P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (footnote omitted). As noted by the district court, it had 
ongoing jurisdiction to supervise Ruck's probation and to determine any 
probation violations Ruck might commit. l.C. § 20-222. (See R., pp. 247-48.) 
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Because the court had ongoing jurisdiction in the criminal case, the 
criminal case was pending for purposes of l.C.R. 41 (e). The plain language and 
clear intent of the rule is that the court with familiarity with and jurisdiction over 
the criminal proceedings is the proper forum for determining whether to return 
property seized as part of a criminal investigation, but if no court had acquired 
jurisdiction, or if criminal jurisdiction had ended, potentially aggrieved parties 
should still have a forum to seek a remedy. Because the district court in this 
case had jurisdiction over the probation, the district court properly concluded it 
was the proper forum for the l.C.R. 41 (e) motion.2 
II. 
MLDC Has Failed To Show It Was Entitled To The Laptop 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that the laptop was properly seized pursuant to a 
probation search. (R., vol. II, pp. 248-52.) MLDC argues that the district court 
erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-43.) Application of the proper legal standards 
shows no error because the laptop was reasonably shown to have been in 
probationer Ruck's possession. 
2 Even if the district court should have treated this as a civil petition instead of an 
l.C.R. 41 (e) motion, the error was harmless. The rules of civil procedure provide 
that the Court "must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." l.R.C.P. 61. Whether the decision 
of the district court was pursuant to criminal motion or civil petition is ultimately 
irrelevant to the outcome of the proceeding, and thus by definition any error was 
harmless. , 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). Because the question 
before the district court was whether the laptop was "illegally seized," l.C.R. 
41 (e), this standard of review would also be applicable in this case. 
C. The Laptop Was Legally Seized 
MLDC is only entitled to return of the laptop if it was "illegally seized." 
I.RE. 41 (e). The seizure of the laptop was legal, however, for two reasons. 
First, the seizure was based on reasonable suspicion that it contains evidence of 
a probation violation by Ruck. Second, the seizure of the laptop is within the 
scope of Ruck's probationary consent to searches. Finally, the seizure of the 
laptop did not exceed the scope of a proper probationary search. 
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against 
governmental intrusion. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a 
probationer is subject to warrantless searches by a probation officer if that 
probation officer has reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated 
probation. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-
88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 (2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after 
conviction but before sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion); 
State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) 
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(probation searches based on suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of 
a warrantless search condition"). The probation officer had reasonable suspicion 
that Ruck had violated his probation both by traveling out of state without consent 
and by having credit cards. (R., vol. II, pp. 158, 168-70, 246.) Thus, the seizure 
and search of the computer is reasonable based on suspicion that Ruck violated 
the terms of his probation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court "has determined that a probationer's consent to 
searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights." State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 
841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987)). A search of probationers or parolees is reasonable 
if conducted according to an express probation or parole provision allowing 
suspicionless searches. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006). Where 
the search is pursuant to a specific provision of probation or parole that allows 
suspicionless searches, the reasonableness of the search does not rely on the 
consent exception. ill at 852 n.3 ("we decline to rest our holding today on the 
consent rationale"). The seizure and search was thus also justified by Ruck's 
probationary waiver of Fourth Amendment rights even if suspicionless. (R., vol. 
II, pp. 248-52.) 
The scope of a probationary search and seizure of property is based on 
"joint access or control of the property searched." State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 
728, 730-31, 40 P.3d 86, 88-89 (2002). The inquiry "does not rest upon the law 
of property" but whether the probationer had "joint access or control for most 
purposes." ill at 731, 40 P.3d at 89 (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, a 
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probationary search of a container or area must be based on "reasonable 
suspicion that [the probationer] owned, possessed, or controlled the item." kl 
The district court applied the rule as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Barker. (R., vol. II, p. 249.) The Court found reasonable suspicion that Ruck 
controlled the laptop based on evidence that Ruck claimed ownership of the 
backpack where the laptop was found and other evidence of probation violations 
was also found in the backpack. Ruck stated he used the laptop for business 
purposes and had the password to access it. Even MLDC's witness admitted 
Ruck's possession and control of the laptop. (R., vol. II, p. 250.) Because a 
probation search and seizure of the laptop was justified by both reasonable 
suspicion of a probation violation and a condition of probation allowing 
suspicionless searches, and because probationer Ruck had possession and 
control of the laptop, the seizure was proper. 
MLDC attempts to distinguish Barker on the following grounds: (1) There 
is no "convincing evidence" that the laptop contains evidence of Ruck's probation 
violation. (Appellant's brief, p. 35.) The state need not show "convincing 
evidence" that particular evidence would be found on the laptop but only 
reasonable suspicion that Ruck controlled the laptop. Barker, 136 Idaho at 731, 
40 P.3d at 89. Because the evidence showed Ruck controlled the laptop it was 
within the scope of a proper probationary search. 
(2) Because the laptop was not searched "on site" it was taken outside the 
scope of consent. (Appellant's brief, p. 35.) MLDC's argument appears to be 
that by taking control of the laptop the government deprived Ruck of possession, 
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and therefore removed the laptop from the scope of the probation search. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35.) This argument is nonsensical. The scope of a 
probation search is not based on mere possession but on "access or control for 
most purposes." Barker, 136 Idaho at 731, 40 P.3d at 89. The state submits that 
the relevant time-frame for such in inquiry is when the government seized the 
laptop. Otherwise a probation officer could never conduct a search of any item 
or container he seizes. MLDC's proposed standard of depriving the probation 
officer the ability to search any item or container he seizes is obviously flawed. 
(3) MLDC argues it has the ability to prevent a search of the laptop by 
objecting. (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-31, 34.) MLDC relies on Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the 
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as 
reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to police by another resident." 
MLDC's contention that it is entitled to return of the laptop on this basis is flawed, 
however. 
First, as noted above, the seizure of the laptop was based both on the 
probationary waiver of Fourth Amendment rights and upon the probation 
exception. Neither of these probation and parole exceptions to the warrant 
requirement rely upon a consent rationale. See, SL..9.:.. Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 
n.3 ("we decline to rest our holding today on the consent rationale"). Where the 
government has a legitimate interest in assuring compliance with probation or 
parole, such an interest is not defeated merely because of an objection by a third 
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party. See State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 911 n.3, 174 P.3d 876, 881 n.3 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (search of apartment where probationer Cruz was houseguest did not 
violate Cruz's rights regardless of whether evidence would have been admissible 
against resident of apartment). Because the state does not need a probationer's 
permission to conduct a probation search based on probable cause or a specific 
provision allowing suspicionless searches, denial of consent by another resident 
or person with control does not make the ensuing search or seizure 
unreasonable under the rationale of Randolph. MLDC's objection is not effective 
to prevent the state from asserting its interests in monitoring Ruck's probation. 
Second, l.R.E. 41(e) allows for the return of property "on the ground that 
that the person is entitled to lawful possession of the property and that it was 
illegally seized." (Emphasis added.) Because the laptop was not seized over the 
"express refusal of consent by a physically present resident" its seizure does not 
fall within the ambit of the holding of Randolph. Thus, even under a consent 
rationale MLDC has failed to show entitlement to return of the laptop. 
MLDC has failed to show that the laptop was illegally seized. It has 
therefore failed to show error in the district court's denial of MLDC's request that 
the laptop be turned over to it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of MLDC's request for custody of the laptop taken from probationer Ruck. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2012. 
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